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Abstract
Purpose – This study empirically examines perceptions of environmental report believability based on a
firm’s relative performance and level of assurance obtained on environmental activities under the recently
clarified and recodified attestation standards in the United States.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a 2 3 3 between-subjects experiment to identify
differences in 153 non-expert environmental report users’ perceptions of report believability based on positive
or negative firm performance and (level of) assurance provided by an accounting firm.
Findings – Results show a main effect in that negative performance reports are perceived to be more
believable than positive performance reports, as driven by negative performance reports being significantly
more believable when no assurance is present. The firm performance effect is eliminated once limited or
reasonable assurance is provided. Further, positive performance reports with limited, but not reasonable,
assurance are perceived to be more believable than reports without assurance. No differences are identified
within the negative performance condition.
Practical implications – Limited assurance might be used as an impression management tool to enhance the
believability of positive performance environmental reports. Users, practitioners, and standard-setters should
also be aware that users might believe environmental reports are assured, even when no such assurance has
been provided.
Originality/value – This paper examines the impact of assured environmental reporting on users that review
firms’ environmental reports outside of a shareholder/investor role. The study also demonstrates conditions in
which firm performance and assurance impact perceptions of report believability.
Keywords Environmental CSR reports, Attestation, Reasonable assurance, Limited assurance
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting is largely a voluntary activity in the United
States (US) (GRI, 2014a), and firms that make these disclosures tend to focus on areas of
positive performance (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Cho and Patten,
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2007; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Boiral, 2013; Cho et al., 2015a)[1]. At the same time, a growing
number of companies now obtain assurance on their CSR reports (KPMG, 2017). This
environment introduces an interesting question to management, whether or not to have their
CSR report assured. Theory on firm performance suggests that reports of positive firm
performance are less inherently believable, and thus might be more believable if
independently assured (Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004). However, if a
firm consumes resources to voluntarily track and report CSR activities, must it also then
purchase (a certain level of) assurance on positive performance results so that these are
perceived to be as believable as if the firm had reported negative results? This study uses an
experiment to examine perceptions of environmental CSR report believability for firms that
disclose positive or negative performance and obtain no, limited, or reasonable assurance
from an accounting firm under the recently clarified and recodified attestation standards in
the US (AICPA, 2016). In doing so, the paper studies non-expert environmental report users
who are not evaluating the report as part of an investment or firm-valuation decision. The
study therefore responds to a call by Moser and Martin (2012) to examine the impact of
accountability reporting on users that confront this information outside of a wealthmaximization decision, and thus acknowledges that such “disclosures could serve a broader
purpose than simply providing value-relevant information to shareholders” (p. 798).
Environmental reporting is a subset of CSR reporting, which is an organization’s
disclosure of the “economic, environmental and social impacts caused by its everyday
activities” (GRI, 2014a). While accounting firms, specialty consultants, and others provide
assurance on CSR disclosures (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009; Peters and
Romi, 2014), this study focuses on independent assurance from accounting firms given the
widespread efforts of the profession to offer a robust CSR assurance framework (Peters and
Romi, 2014; AICPA, 2017). Several accounting studies show that assurance from accountants
influences users’ perceptions of financial and non-financial information (e.g. Kinney, 2000;
Mercer, 2004; Simnett et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 2011). However, it is not yet clear whether
users differentiate between levels of assurance (Hasan et al., 2003; Schelluch and Gay, 2006;
Hodge et al., 2009; Low and Boo, 2012; Riviere-Giordano et al., 2018). The clarified and
recodified US attestation standards (herein, the “clarified US attestation standards”) allow
independent accountants to provide limited or reasonable assurance on CSR disclosures for
review or examination engagements, respectively (AICPA, 2016). Of the US firms that issued
assured CSR reports in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) framework in
2013, a total of 76.2 percent (32/42) were issued with limited assurance and the balance with
reasonable assurance (GRI, 2014b).
This paper finds evidence that non-expert environmental report users expect companies
will disclose favorable performance reports. As such, the study is consistent with
Verrecchia’s (1983) discussion that, with discretionary disclosures, users have rational
expectations that management will withhold unfavorable news. Psychology theory on
communication suggests that individuals are more influenced by a message when their
expectation of that message is disconfirmed (Eagly et al., 1978). This suggests that
management’s report depicting negative environmental performance should be perceived as
more believable than when reporting positive performance. Because information about a
firm’s negative environmental performance should be perceived as more believable, there
may be less opportunity for external assurance to incrementally enhance report believability,
making it less likely that users will differentiate between no assurance and the different levels
of assurance for firms with negative performance. Along the same lines, users may find
positive performance disclosures to be less inherently believable (Mercer, 2004). Thus, there
should be more of an opportunity for assurance to enhance the perceived believability of
management’s report for companies with positive performance (cf. Kinney, 2000), such that
users will differentiate between no assurance and the different levels of assurance.

This study uses a 2 3 3 experimental design in which relative firm environmental
performance (positive or negative) and assurance provided (none, limited, or reasonable
assurance) are manipulated between participants. Participants were 153 individuals residing
in the US, with general business knowledge and experience with investing activities as
recruited through a crowdsourcing service, Amazon Mechanical Turk. This study refers to
the participants as non-expert environmental report users because they should have an
understanding of firm disclosures, but need not be experts with environmental-specific
disclosures. Further, participants were not primed to approach their role from an investment
or firm valuation perspective, and thus their responses should be representative of a broad
group of stakeholders. The experiment focused on one aspect of environmental reporting,
greenhouse gas emissions, and was administered using Qualtrics. Each participant reviewed
the environmental report for a hypothetical company that indicated either positive or
negative performance relative to the industry average across a series of indicators. Then,
participants in an assurance condition read the associated independent accountant’s
report that presented either a limited or a reasonable level of assurance. After reading the
experimental materials, participants were asked a series of questions to capture
the dependent variables, three of which were used to create an index to assess perceptions
of the believability of management’s environmental report.
The focus of this study on believability comes from (1) Kinney’s (2000) finding that
independent assurance enhances the credibility of management’s disclosures, and (2)
Mercer’s (2004) clarification that disclosure credibility represents “perceptions of the
believability of a particular disclosure” (p. 186). Therefore, this paper interprets previous
studies on disclosure/report credibility as pursuits to determine if users found the associated
information to be believable. To perform a comprehensive review of disclosure/report
credibility, it is necessary to acknowledge that the extant literature largely uses the terms
credibility and reliability in much the same way (e.g. Flanagin and Metzger, 2000; Kinney,
2000; Fargher and Gramling, 2003; Mercer, 2004; Schelluch and Gay, 2006; Nugent and
Simnett, 2007; Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 2011). As such, this study
considers previous findings about perceptions of disclosure/report credibility and/or
reliability to develop a theoretical argument for what makes disclosures/reports more (or
less) believable to users.
Findings indicate that users perceive environmental reports to be believable, but there is
no main effect for the provision/level of assurance obtained. Consistent with the theory (e.g.
Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004), there is a main effect for firm performance in
which negative performance reports are perceived to be more believable than positive
performance reports. Further analyses reveal this effect is driven by negative performance
reports being perceived as significantly more believable when no assurance is present. The
firm performance effect is eliminated when limited or reasonable assurance is provided. This
study also identifies an interaction in which positive performance reports with limited, but
not reasonable, assurance are perceived to be more believable than reports with no assurance.
No differences are identified in the believability of negative performance reports due to the
provision or level of assurance.
Results of this study inform academics, practitioners, and standard setters. For academics,
theory on firm performance suggests that users find reports depicting negative firm
performance to be more believable than reports depicting positive performance (e.g. Williams,
1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004). This study reinforces firm performance theory when
no assurance is present, but provides evidence that assurance on environmental reports
serves to eliminate differences in report believability that stem from firm performance.
Findings also partially support the notion that the influence of assurance is limited to positive
performance conditions (Coram et al., 2009), and that non-expert users do not differentiate
between levels of assurance (e.g. Hasan et al., 2003; Hodge et al., 2009). Further, this study

focuses on whether environmental disclosures are believable to the broader group of users
who are not evaluating the information as part of a wealth-maximization decision (Moser and
Martin, 2012). From a practitioner standpoint, this study demonstrates that if a firm seeks to
use its environmental report to speak to a broader group of stakeholders, limited assurance is
an effective tool to enhance report believability when performance is positive. Finally, from a
standard-setter perspective, this study calls into question whether users would benefit from
formal reporting requirements that have companies explicitly specify when no assurance is
provided on environmental disclosures/reports.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. It begins with a review of the
relevant literature and hypothesis development. Next appears the research design, which is
followed by a description of the results. The study concludes with a summary of key
takeaways and insights into the findings.
2. Background and hypothesis development
2.1 Assured CSR reporting in the US
Globally, the practice of reporting on CSR activities is becoming “standard practice” for firms
(KPMG, 2017, p. 4). Even so, there is a lack of widespread structure and conformity in CSR
reporting across the US, and firms have a great deal of flexibility in deciding how to disclose
such non-financial information (Cohen et al., 2012). For example, using a sample of US firms,
Holder-Webb et al. (2009) find that large firms predominantly make these disclosures (from
most to least common) on their corporate websites, stand-alone governance documents,
mandatory filings, and product fact sheets. Disclosures for smaller firms were found
primarily in mandatory filings (Holder-Webb et al., 2009). Given the absence of a widely
agreed-upon reporting mechanism and format, Cohen et al. (2012) suggest the credibility of
CSR disclosures would benefit from external assurance.
The number of large firms issuing assured CSR reports is on the rise (Green and Zhou,
2013; Junior et al., 2014; KPMG, 2017). Although the level of assured CSR reporting in the US
currently lags behind that seen in many other countries (KPMG, 2017), CSR initiatives are
becoming increasingly popular (Ballou et al., 2012) and US accounting firms are beginning to
invest in CSR services (Gunther, 2010; Foster, 2012; KPMG, 2013). It is therefore not
surprising that the US has witnessed a recent increase in the number of assured CSR reports
(GRI, 2014b). At the same time, Peters and Romi (2014) have found an increase in the valuerelevance of CSR assurance provided by accountants. The evolving CSR environment in the
US has also impacted standard-setters.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issues and maintains the
US attestation standards related to verification of non-financial information, including CSR
disclosures. Recently, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB) completed the
Attestation Clarity Project, which clarified and recodified the US attestation standards.
The resulting standards are similar to the standards of the International Auditing and
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) that issues International Standards on Assurance
Engagements (ISAEs). However, full convergence to IAASB standards did not occur due to
“the US profession’s experience with the attestation standards during the past 25 years” and
the “inconsistencies with other US professional standards” that would have resulted (AICPA,
2013a, p. 6). Of particular interest to this study, the clarified US attestation standards now
echo ISAEs and define the two levels of assurance in attestation engagements as being either
limited or reasonable[2]. Reasonable assurance is the highest level of assurance currently
offered and is provided when an examination is performed, while limited assurance is
provided as part of a review (AICPA, 2016). Further, reasonable assurance is positively
expressed as an opinion (i.e. “we believe that. . .”), whereas limited assurance is negatively
expressed as a conclusion (i.e. “nothing came to our attention that. . .”) (AICPA, 2016).

One reason firms might seek independent assurance on their CSR disclosures is to
influence report users’ perceptions of those reports (cf. Simnett et al., 2009; GRI, 2014b; Junior
et al., 2014). The next section considers the influence of assurances like those defined by
the AICPA.
2.2 Impact of assurance on reported information
Simnett et al. (2009) point out that assurance is not free and is purchased when the benefits
presumably outweigh the costs. The benefits of assuring a CSR report may include enhancing
disclosure credibility, building corporate reputation, increasing user confidence in the
(completeness of) disclosed information, and reducing information asymmetry (Holder-Webb
et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Boiral and Gendron, 2011; Pflugrath et al., 2011; Junior et al.,
2014; Cho et al., 2014; Casey and Grenier, 2015; Cohen and Simnett, 2015). Assurance of CSR
information is also associated with increased environmental reputation (Birkey et al., 2016),
and can enhance the quality of environmental reports in the eyes of stakeholders (Moroney
et al., 2012). Investors have also been shown to consider the reliability of sustainability
information in assessing a company’s market value (Lackmann et al., 2012). Finally, Wong
and Millington (2014) find that stakeholders demand CSR assurance when they assess the
value of the CSR information to be high and when they believe the representational
faithfulness of the disclosures to be low. In summary, CSR assurance is an important tool for
management to use in shaping their reputation and to combat the uncertainty users may feel
when reviewing CSR reports.
Prior research examines the use of different assurers of CSR information. While not
unanimous (e.g. Wong and Millington, 2014), the extant research demonstrates the
importance of obtaining assurance from accountants/accounting firms. For example,
accountants are more cautious, limited in approach, and offer lower levels of assurance than
consultant assurers, which might relate to the accounting profession’s robust reporting
frameworks and assurance/attestation standards, as well as its rules on independence and
professional conduct (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005). Studies have also found that accounting
firms provide the highest quality of assurance on CSR reports (Perego and Kolk, 2012; Casey
and Grenier, 2015), that assurance from accountants is more trustworthy, expert, and credible
(Pflugrath et al., 2011), and that more expert environmental committees (on the board of
directors) prefer CSR assurance from accounting firms (Peters and Romi, 2014). Further,
Hodge et al. (2009) find that users perceive CSR reports with reasonable (but not limited)
assurance to be more credible when issued by an accounting firm rather than by a specialist
consultant firm. Finally, in speaking about the success of companies strategically integrating
internal functions with CSR initiatives, Ballou et al. (2012) find that “obtaining assurance is
associated with strategic integration, especially when provided by a public accounting firm”
(p. 267).
Given the benefits of CSR assurance described to this point, it is also necessary to
highlight the body of work that questions the value of this assurance. Boiral and Gendron
(2011) challenge CSR assurance engagements as having structural deficiencies and lacking
appropriate rigor. O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) raise concerns over management’s involvement
in the assurance process and question the independence of assurance providers. Green and Li
(2011) document an expectation gap in the responsibilities perceived by preparers and
assurers when issuing greenhouse gas emissions reports to stakeholders. Michelon et al.
(2015) find that assurance of CSR disclosures is used more to manage corporate image rather
than to enhance the accountability of reported information. Finally, Talbot and Boiral (2018)
study the energy sector and find widespread issues with CSR disclosures that do not comply
with the GRI guidelines, even after an audit by third-party accountants. Collectively, these
findings challenge the quality of CSR disclosures/reports, even when they are accompanied
by external assurance.

2.3 Levels of assurance
As alluded to with the findings of Hodge et al. (2009), a discussion of assurance on CSR
information provided by professional accountants would not be complete without
considering the two levels of assurance available under the US attestation standards.
These levels are limited and reasonable assurance (AICPA, 2016). As previously described,
reasonable assurance is delivered with an opinion or positive expression of assurance,
while limited assurance is delivered with a conclusion or negative expression of assurance
(AICPA, 2016). Studies find that users differentiate between positive and negative
expressions of assurance, in that positive provides more assurance (Gay et al., 1998) and
makes the underlying information more reliable (Schelluch and Gay, 2006).
It is not clear whether users differentiate between levels of assurance with CSR reporting.
Hasan et al. (2003) used a CSR reporting scenario to examine whether shareholders perceive a
difference in assurance provided between a high assurance report and four different
moderate assurance reports[3]. Their results indicate that users differentiate between high
and moderate assurance with three of four examined iterations of a moderate assurance CSR
report, including a moderate assurance report with a negative assurance statement. Later,
when Hodge et al. (2009) experimented with users’ ability to differentiate between levels of
assurance provided on CSR reports, they failed to find a main effect for users’ confidence and
perceptions of credibility with CSR reports. Finally, Riviere-Giordano et al. (2018) identified a
penalty for firms that obtain lower levels of assurance on environmental disclosures, such
that financial analysts are less likely to recommend companies that obtain lower levels of
assurance (rather than no assurance) on environmental disclosures. In sum, these studies fail
to establish whether users differentiate between levels of assurance on CSR disclosures and
reports.
Low and Boo (2012) conducted an experiment that helped untangle when users
differentiate between levels of assurance being conveyed. Specifically, they found that lessinformed users benefit from contrasting statements to distinguish between limited and
reasonable assurance. Under the clarified US attestation standards, limited assurance reports
refer to the availability of a higher level of assurance (i.e. reasonable assurance). However,
reasonable assurance reports make no contrast to the lower level of available assurance (i.e.
limited assurance). Under this current reporting format, only more informed users can
distinguish the level of assurance being conveyed. As such, Low and Boo (2012) show that
having a contrast statement in both the limited and reasonable assurance reports improves
less informed users’ understanding of the level of assurance being conveyed. This finding is
supported by prior research that shows comparative information, when available, is used by
decision- makers (e.g. Slovic and MacPhillamy, 1974; Lipe and Salterio, 2000).
2.4 Firm CSR performance and user expectations of performance
Given the voluntary nature of CSR reporting, companies primarily make “self-laudatory” or
largely positive CSR disclosures (Holder-Webb et al., 2009, p. 517). Signaling theory suggests
that firms with positive performance disclose this information to show their elevated
commitment to CSR activities (Mahoney et al., 2013), while Moser and Martin and Moser
(2016) find that the aim of such disclosures is to receive a positive response from users.
However, environmental disclosures do not always align with the true performance of
companies.
Research has identified several reporting biases/tactics that firms use when disclosing
CSR information. For example, companies with poorer CSR performance tend to provide
offsetting favorable disclosures (O’Donovan, 1999; Cho and Patten, 2007), use disclosures
with more optimism and less certainty (Cho et al., 2010), disclose less environmental
information (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004), and disclose environmental capital spending to hedge
against political and regulatory concerns (Cho et al., 2012). Studies have also shown that

annual report disclosures focus on positive rather than on negative environmental results
(Deegan and Gordon, 1996), companies underreport negative events (Hughes et al., 2001;
Adams, 2004; Boiral, 2013), and companies prosecuted for environmental issues have
increased reporting of favorable environmental news around the time of the associated trial
(Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Further, Cho et al. (2015a) argue that competing societal and
institutional pressures prevent companies from making substantive sustainability
disclosures, while Cho et al. (2015b) find that corporate legitimacy drives CSR reporting
rather than the desire to provide investors with valuable information. Given this stream of
research, it is not surprising that recent calls from practice and the accounting literature
indicate a desire for firms to use balanced reporting that includes both positive and negative
CSR activities (KPMG and SustainAbility, 2008; Cohen, 2014)[4].
A firm’s CSR performance can influence user decision-making (Elliott et al., 2014), and
there are several approaches to predict how users will respond to these positive or negative
disclosures. One approach suggests users find positive news disclosures to be less credible
than negative news disclosures (Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004) and that
assurance may only influence user decision-making in positive performance conditions
(Coram et al., 2009). However, this would not provide for a robust prediction given there might
be a pre-existing user expectation that firms would disclose only positive news in CSR
reporting (cf. Verrecchia, 1983; KPMG and SustainAbility, 2008). Further, managers have
more incentive to provide positive (rather than negative) disclosures (Verrecchia, 1983;
McNichols, 1989). Therefore, an appropriate approach to examine the influence of firm
environmental performance on user perceptions of environmental report believability takes
into account the expectation that firms will report positive performance.
Persuasion theory offers insight into how individuals react when their expectations of a
message are (dis)confirmed. Specifically, individuals are more influenced (persuaded) when
they do not expect a messenger to accurately report reality (i.e. the messenger is perceived to
have a reporting bias), but then the actual message appears to be truthful and disconfirms
these expectations (Eagly et al., 1978). Based on the findings of KPMG and SustainAbility
(2008), this study posits that users expect a reporting bias in that firms will primarily disclose
positive environmental performance. This is consistent with Verrecchia (1983), who provides
that users have rational expectations that management will withhold unfavorable news with
discretionary disclosures. Therefore, theory suggests these users will perceive any non-selfinterested (i.e. negative performance) disclosures to be more believable than disclosures of
positive performance (Eagly et al., 1978; Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004).
2.5 Hypotheses
Based on the preceding discussion, this study tests five hypotheses. First, if users find
environmental reports that disclose negative performance to be inherently believable,
environmental reports that disclose negative performance will be perceived to be more
believable than environmental reports that disclose positive performance, holding constant the
level of assurance. Hypothesis 1 formally predicts a main effect for firm performance as follows:
H1. Users will perceive management’s environmental report to be more believable in the
negative rather than in the positive performance condition across levels of assurance
(i.e. none, limited, and reasonable assurance).
The presented literature also provides a theoretical basis that assurance should enhance the
perceived believability of environmental reports. However, prior research does not clearly
support whether environmental report believability differs when a limited versus reasonable
level of assurance is provided. Therefore, H2 and H3 offer separate predictions for main
effects related to (1) the provision of assurance, and (2) the level of assurance on perceptions of
environmental report believability:

H2. Users will perceive management’s assured environmental report to be more
believable than management’s non-assured environmental report across firm
performance conditions.
H3. Users will not perceive a difference in the believability of management’s
environmental report when limited versus reasonable assurance is provided
across firm performance conditions.
Finally, the discussed literature suggests that the provision/level of assurance should
influence users’ perceptions of environmental report believability when firms disclose
positive, but not negative, performance. Specifically, users should perceive the environmental
report to be more believable when it is assured (versus not assured) in a positive performance
condition. However, it is unclear in the positive performance condition whether users will
perceive the environmental report to be more believable when offered limited assurance (with
a contrast statement) versus reasonable assurance (with no contrast statement). The final two
hypotheses address these two scenarios within the positive performance condition:
H4. Users will perceive management’s assured environmental report to be more
believable than management’s non-assured environmental report in the positive
performance condition.
H5. Users will not perceive a difference in the believability of management’s
environmental report when limited versus reasonable assurance is provided in the
positive performance condition.
See Figure 1 for predicted relationships.

3. Research design
3.1 Participants
Participants for the study were recruited through a crowdsourcing tool, Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk)[5]. To take part in the study, programmed system controls required
participants to be located in the US and have a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) acceptance
rate of greater than or equal to 90 percent. MTurk allows requestors (i.e. those conducting a
study) to review responses from MTurk workers and either approve or deny payment; thus,
by requiring a HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 90 percent, the requestor is trying to
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Figure 1.
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attract participants with a proven record of submitting acceptable HITs. Participants were
also asked whether they (1) were at least 18 years old, (2) had purchased stock in the past
12 months, and (3) had not bought/sold/traded stock as part of their employment
responsibilities (cf. Ozlanski, 2013); only those responding “Yes” to each of these three
questions were given access to the instrument. Based on these requirements, participants
were individuals with general business knowledge and experience with investing activities,
and served as proxies for non-expert users of environmental reports[6].
In total, 260 participants completed the experiment, but only 153 of the responses could be
analyzed. Participants were not analyzed if they did not pass all four comprehension check
questions, did not have a worker ID appear in the MTurk output (i.e. a unique ID used to
identify participants), or did not answer any of the dependent variable questions. The four
multiple-choice comprehension check questions included the following. (1) As described in
the Independent Accountant’s Report, did the accountant provide the same verification (i.e.
assurance) on all four greenhouse gas emission indicators? (2) Who prepared the Independent
Accountant’s Report? (3) Did the Independent Accountant’s Report relate to TWBC’s
financial statements or greenhouse gas emissions? (4) How many methods to verify (i.e.
assure) TWBC’s greenhouse gas emissions are described in the Independent Accountant’s
Report?
Participants were also removed for spending less than five minutes on the experiment.
This action was to disqualify participants that clearly did not complete the experiment, and
likely accessed and then quickly exited the survey just to receive payment. Based on this
requirement, three participants who spent an average of 6.3 s on the experiment were
removed. Finally, participants were removed if they did not pass a manipulation check
question about the firm’s relative environmental performance. The manipulation check
question asked the following: “How did you perceive TWBC’s performance in controlling
greenhouse gas emissions as compared to the industry average?” Participants responded
using a fully labeled seven-point Likert scale with endpoints Much Worse (3) and Much
Better (þ3). Participants in the positive performance condition were removed for responses
from (3) to (0), while participants in the negative performance condition were removed for
responses from (0) to (þ3). The study did not use a qualifying manipulation check on the level
of perceived assurance. Rather, it sought to measure perceptions of limited and reasonable
assurance using the AICPA’s recommended verbiage for the Independent Accountant’s
Report. These results appear later in Section 4.2, Analyses of other dependent measures.
For the 153 useable participants, the experiment had an average duration of 26.0 min with
an SD of 17.6 min (low 5 6.2 min; high 5 85.4 min). Each participant was paid $2.50, which
resulted in an effective hourly rate of $5.77, well above the effective hourly rate of $3.75
documented in Rennekamp (2012). Participants’ demographic information appears in Table I.
Of the 153 accepted participants: (1) 57.2 percent were male and 42.8 percent were female (one
participant did not respond to the gender question, so this is based on a denominator of 152),
(2) 38.6 percent were in the age group of 35–54 and another 34.6 percent were in the age group
of 26–34 years, and (3) 55.6 percent had at least a four-year college degree. All 153 accepted
participants completed the case study in one sitting, and three of the accepted participants
reported to be (or at one time were) certified public accountants (CPAs).
3.2 Experimental task and materials
This study uses a 2 3 3 between-subjects design in which relative firm environmental
performance (positive, negative) and assurance provided (none, limited, reasonable) are
manipulated. Figure 2 provides a flowchart of the experimental procedures. The experiment
was administered online using Qualtrics, and participants were randomly assigned to a
group based on an automated routine in Qualtrics. Upon accessing the study, participants
reviewed the experimental instructions and then received background information on the

Table I.
Participant
demographic
information

Question

Response options

What is your gender?
A

Male
Female

How old are you?

18–25
26–34
35–54
55–64
65 or over

What is the highest
level
of education you have
completed?

<4-years College
Degree
4-years college
degree
Postgrad or some
postgrad

All participants
% of
Count
total

Accepted
participants
% of
Count
total

Rejected
participants
% of
Count
total

147
111
258
65
93
82
15
5
260
129

57.0%
43.0%
100.0%
25.0%
35.8%
31.5%
5.8%
1.9%
100.0%
49.6%

87
65
152
27
53
59
10
4
153
68

57.2%
42.8%
100.0%
17.6%
34.6%
38.6%
6.5%
2.6%
100.0%
44.4%

60
46
106
38
40
23
5
1
107
61

56.6%
43.4%
100.0%
35.5%
37.4%
21.5%
4.7%
0.9%
100.0%
57.0%

96

36.9%

61

39.9%

35

32.7%

35

13.5%

24

15.7%

11

10.3%

260
100.0%
153
100.0%
107
100.0%
Note(s): A–Two of the 260 participants did not respond to this question; one was an accepted participant and
one was a rejected participant

Experimental instructions
Background information
Excerpts from environmental CSR report:
Part 1: Firm's disclosure and discussion of greenhouse gas emissions
Manipulation #1: Relative Firm Environmental Performance
Positive or Negative Relative Firm Performance
Part 2: Independent accountant's report on greenhouse gas emissions
Manipulation #2: Assurance Provided
No Assurance

Figure 2.
Flowchart of
experimental
procedures

Limited Assurance

Reasonable Assurance

Dependent Variable and Comprehension Check questions
Demographic questions

fictitious Tasty Water Beverage Company (TWBC). After reviewing the background
information, participants viewed excerpts from the most recent TWBC environmental CSR
report. The report consisted of (1) a report cover page, (2) TWBC presentation and discussion
of its greenhouse gas emissions for the year, including its performance in relation to the food
and beverage industry, and (3) an independent accountant’s report. TWBC was intentionally
placed in the food and beverage industry, as KPMG (2013) indicates this industry performs at
the global average in terms of the quality and number of CSR reports issued. Further,

TWBC’s presentation and discussion of greenhouse gas emissions highlighted four
environmental indicators defined by the GRI G4 framework (GRI, 2013): G4-EN15: Direct
greenhouse gas emissions; G4-EN16: Energy indirect greenhouse gas emissions; G4-EN17:
Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions; and G4-EN19: Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
(GRI, 2014c)[7]. The GRI G4 framework is the most commonly used CSR reporting framework
worldwide (KPMG, 2017). The study focuses on greenhouse gas emission disclosures because
these are the predominant environmental CSR metrics assured in the US and have the most
robust technical guidance for attestations from independent accountants (AICPA, 2013b;
AICPA, 2017).
As part of TWBC’s presentation and disclosure of the selected GRI G4 indicators, each
indicator was included in a summary table showing the performance of TWBC, the food and
beverage industry average, and TWBC’s percentage difference from the industry average.
TWBC greenhouse gas emission levels reflect those of a company approximately 5 percent of
the size (in terms of emissions) of The Coca-Cola Company or PepsiCo. These same companies
were used as a guide to establish differences in emission levels between EN15, EN16, and
EN17 (i.e. EN16 emissions are approximately double the EN15 emissions, and EN17
emissions are approximately 1.82 times the EN15 emissions). Consistent with Elliott et al.
(2014), TWBC’s performance was manipulated with respect to performance against the
industry average to establish positive or negative relative environmental performance.
Indicators EN15, EN16, and EN17 varied from the industry average by approximately—60
percent or þ60 percent in the positive and negative performance conditions. Indicator EN19
was presented as a percentage reduction in emissions of approximately þ60 percent and—60
percent (i.e. an increase) in the positive and negative performance conditions. The magnitude
of differences to establish positive and negative performance is consistent with the approach
used by Elliott et al. (2014).
The assurance manipulation (for participants in an assurance condition) appeared in the
final excerpt from TWBC’s environmental CSR report: the independent accountant’s report.
Here, a large international accounting firm provided either limited or reasonable assurance on
the disclosed greenhouse gas emission indicators. The general format and verbiage of the
independent accountant’s report was guided by examples provided in SOP 13–1, Attest
Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Information (AICPA, 2013b), and the leveraged
verbiage remains consistent with the AICPA’s Attestation Engagements on Sustainability
Information Guide (Including Greenhouse Gas Emissions Information) and the clarified US
attestation standards (AICPA, 2016; AICPA, 2017). Participants were also provided a
summary table of the assured indicators within the independent accountant’s report. Please
refer to the Appendix for excerpts from the experimental materials.
3.3 Dependent variables
After viewing the independent accountant’s report, participants responded to several
dependent variables well established in the accounting literature. As discussed, the primary
measure of interest is environmental report believability. To accomplish this task, three
dependent variables employed by Hodge et al. (2009) were used to create an index to measure
this underlying construct. These items included (with endpoints shown) the following: (1)
How reliable do you find TWBC’s representations made in the Company’s 2014
Environmental Sustainability Report (3 Strongly Not Reliable, þ3 Strongly Reliable), (2)
How credible do you find TWBC’s disclosures about greenhouse gas emissions (3 Strongly
Not Credible, þ3 Strongly Credible), and (3) How confident are you that Tasty Water
Beverage Company’s 2014 Environmental Sustainability Report represents the true
performance of the company with respect to greenhouse gas emissions (3 Strongly Not
Confident, þ3 Strongly Confident)? Based on participants’ responses, these items have a
Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.924, meaning there is strong evidence they measure the same

underlying construct, which, in this study, is referred to as report believability. Only after the
participants had reviewed the experimental materials and responded to the primary
dependent variables, the study asked about the attractiveness of TWBC as a potential
investment opportunity. Finally, the study also asked a series of questions to be analyzed as
possible covariates, including: (1) the perceived assurance provided by the accounting firm
(Hasan et al., 2003), (2) the impact of assurance on the credibility of results, and (3) the
perceived credibility and trustworthiness of management (cf. Mercer, 2004; Beyer et al., 2010;
Pflugrath et al., 2011). Responses to these items were collected with a questionnaire at the end
of the study that used seven-point Likert scales (0–6, or3 to þ3 depending on the question)
with all points labeled and endpoints primarily appearing as Strongly Disagree / Strongly
Agree[8].
4. Results
4.1 Hypotheses tests
Summary statistics for the index used to measure report believability are presented in
Table II, and suggest that participants found management’s environmental report to be
generally believable. Marginal means show that participants rated the environmental report
to be most believable with reasonable assurance (1.803), followed by no assurance (1.773) and
then limited assurance (1.768). As expected, participants rated the report to be more
believable in the negative (1.858) than in the positive (1.702) performance condition. A review
of means by cell reveals a pattern similar to that hypothesized, with the exception of limited
assurance in both the positive and negative performance conditions. Specifically, participants
in the positive performance condition rated the report to be most believable with limited
assurance, while participants in the negative performance condition rated the report to be
least believable with limited assurance. Figure 3 reinforces the unexpected results for limited
assurance.

Firm performance
Positive

Mean, (SD), Sample Size
Assurance
No assurance
Limited
1.4444 (1.1139)
n 5 33
2.1010 (0.7383)
n 5 33
1.7727 (0.9943)

2.0800 (0.5117)
n 5 25
1.3968 (1.5406)
n 5 21
1.7681 (1.1458)

Reasonable
1.6481 (0.9733)
n 5 18
1.9365 (0.9523)
n 5 21
1.8034 (0.9604)

Marginal means

1.7018 (0.9515)
n 5 76
Negative
1.8578 (1.1003)
n 5 75
Marginal Means
Total
Sample
n 5 66
n 5 46
n 5 39
n 5 151
Note(s): This study used three dependent variables to create an index for whether participants believed the
information provided in the environmental report. Results of the believability index are reported in this table
The three items have high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.924), and each item was measured using a fully
labeled seven-point Likert scale with endpoints as shown below:
(1) How reliable do you find TWBC’s representations made in the Company’s 2014 Environmental
Sustainability Report? (3, Strongly Not Reliable, þ3, Strongly Reliable)
Table II.
(2) How credible do you find TWBC’s disclosures about greenhouse gas emissions? (3, Strongly Not
Cell means, standard
Credible, þ3, Strongly Credible)
deviations, and sample
(3) How confident are you that Tasty Water Beverage Company’s 2014 Environmental Sustainability
sizes with believability
Report represents the true performance of the company with respect to greenhouse gas emissions?
of management’s
(3, Strongly Not Confident, þ3, Strongly Confident)
environmental report
Note that the total number of participants shown in this table is 151, as two participants did not answer all three
as the dependent
items and were therefore removed from this analysis
variable

Prior to testing hypotheses, the data were reviewed for conformity with the basic
assumptions of ANOVA, including independence of observations, normal distribution of the
dependent variables, and homogeneity of variance (Keppel, 1991, p. 97). Based on this review,
the data did not sufficiently achieve normal distribution or homogeneity of variance. As such,
the statistical analyses used to test hypotheses are Mann–Whitney U tests, the
nonparametric equivalent of t-tests (Corder and Foreman, 2014).
As described, this study uses five hypotheses to predict perceptions of environmental
report believability; H1, H2, and H3 predict main effects of relative firm performance and use/
level of assurance, while H4 and H5 predict relationships within the positive performance
condition. Hypothesis 1 predicts a main effect in that users perceive management’s
environmental report to be more believable in the negative than in the positive performance
condition across levels of assurance. Based on a Mann–Whitney U test comparing the
marginal means of performance conditions, the mean rank is significantly higher in the
negative performance condition than in the positive performance condition (p 5 0.047, onetailed). This serves as evidence that users perceive negative environmental performance
reports to be more believable than positive performance reports. See Panel A of Table III for
supporting analyses.
Hypothesis 2 predicts a main effect for assurance, such that users perceive management’s
assured environmental report to be more believable than a non-assured report. To test this,
the no assurance cell was first compared to both assurance cells (i.e. combined limited and
reasonable). Results indicate there is not a significant difference in the mean rank of assured
versus non-assured cells (p 5 0.326, one-tailed). The next test compared the no assurance cell
separately against the limited and reasonable assurance cells. Again, results indicate there
are not significant differences in mean ranks between no assurance and limited assurance
(p 5 0.316, one-tailed), and no assurance versus reasonable assurance (p 5 0.397, one-tailed).
As such, there does not appear to be a main effect for the use of assurance. See Panel B of
Table III for supporting analyses. For H3, a null hypothesis is used to predict the lack of a
main effect, such that users do not perceive a difference in environmental report believability
when provided limited versus reasonable assurance. Results show there is not a significant
difference in mean ranks between limited and reasonable assurance (p 5 0.881, two-tailed),
and thus H3 cannot be rejected. Based on the testing of H2 and H3, there is no evidence that
users perceive a difference in environmental report believability based solely on the use or
level of assurance.
For H4 and H5, this study relies on the theory that the impact of assurance on user
decision-making might be context-specific to a positive performance condition (Coram et al.,
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Panel A: Main effects of firm performance (H1)
Effect of firm
Source of
performance
variation
N
Across all assurance
conditions

Positive
performance
Negative
performance

Mean
rank

Sum of
rank

U-value

Z

p-value
(one-tailed)

76

70.11

5328.0

3298.0

1.665

0.047

75

81.97

6148.0

2402.0

Sum of
rank

U-value

Z

p-value
(one-tailed)

Panel B: Main effects of level of assurance (H2 and H3)
Effect of level of
Mean
assurance
Source of variation
N
rank
Across both
performance
conditions
Across both
performance
conditions
Across both
performance
conditions
Across both
performance
conditions

No assurance
Assurance (limited
and reasonable)
No assurance
Limited assurance
No assurance
Reasonable
assurance
Limited assurance
Reasonable
assurance

66
85

74.18
77.41

4896.0
6580.0

2925.0
2685.0

0.448

0.326

66
46

55.27
58.26

3648.0
2680.0

1599.0
1437.0

0.476

0.316

66
39

52.41
54.00

3459.0
2106.0

1326.0
1248.0

0.255

0.397

46
39

43.37
42.56

1995.0
1660.0

880.0
914.0

0.146

Panel C: Differences due to assurance within the positive performance condition (H4 and H5)
Mean
Sum of
Effect within:
Source of variation
N
rank
rank
U-value
Z
Positive
performance
condition
Positive
performance
condition
Positive
performance
condition
Positive
performance
condition

No assurance
Assurance (limited
and reasonable)
No assurance
Limited assurance
No assurance
Reasonable
assurance
Limited assurance
Reasonable
assurance

Table III.
Nonparametric Mann–
Whitney U tests with
believability of
management’s
environmental report
as the dependent
variable

Negative performance
condition
Negative performance
condition

No assurance
Limited
assurance
No assurance
Reasonable
assurance
Limited
assurance
Reasonable
assurance

p-value
(one-tailed)

33
43

33.06
42.67

1091.0
1835.0

889.0
530.0

1.876

0.030

33
25

25.00
35.44

825.0
886.0

561.0
264.0

2.324

0.010

33
18

25.06
27.72

827.0
499.0

328.0
266.0

0.601

0.274

25
18

24.56
18.44

614.0
332.0

161.0
289.0

1.563

Panel D: Differences due to assurance within the negative performance condition
Source of
Mean
Sum of
Effect within:
variation
N
rank
rank
U-value
Negative performance
condition

0.881a

Z

0.119 a

p-value
(two-tailed)

33
21

29.86
23.79

985.5
499.5

268.5
424.5

1.375

0.168

33
21

28.06
26.62

926.0
559.0

328.0
365.0

0.319

0.749

21

19.55

410.5

261.5

1.019

0.308

21

23.45

492.5

179.5

(continued )

Panel E: Differences due to firm performance within the assurance conditions
Source of
Mean
Sum of
Effect within:
variation
N
rank
rank
U-value

Z

p-value
(two-tailed)

Positive
33
27.68
913.5
736.5
2.456
0.014
performance
Negative
33
39.32
1297.5
352.5
performance
Limited assurance
Positive
25
25.42
635.5
214.5
1.048
0.294
condition
performance
Negative
21
21.21
445.5
310.5
performance
Reasonable assurance Positive
18
17.22
310.0
239.0
1.395
0.165
condition
performance
Negative
21
22.38
470.0
139.0
performance
Note(s): aReported with two tails
This study used three dependent variables to create an index for whether participants believed the information
provided in the environmental report. Results of the believability index are reported in this table. The three
items have high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.924), and each item was measured using a fully labeled sevenpoint Likert scale with endpoints as shown below:
(1) How reliable do you find TWBC’s representations made in the Company’s 2014 Environmental
Sustainability Report? (-3, Strongly Not Reliable, þ3, Strongly Reliable)
(2) How credible do you find TWBC’s disclosures about greenhouse gas emissions? (3, Strongly Not
Credible, þ3, Strongly Credible)
(3) How confident are you that Tasty Water Beverage Company’s 2014 Environmental Sustainability
Report represents the true performance of the company with respect to greenhouse gas emissions?
(3, Strongly Not Confident, þ3, Strongly Confident)
As discussed, the data in this study do not conform to two basic assumptions of ANOVA: normal distribution
and homogeneity of variance. As such, the statistical analyses used to test hypotheses are Mann–Whitney
U-tests, which are the nonparametric equivalent of t-tests (Corder and Foreman, 2014). Given the mechanics of
Mann–Whitney U-tests, the mean rank for a specific condition (e.g. limited assurance, positive performance)
will likely differ based on the condition it is being compared against. This is because the mean rank for a
specific condition is determined based on the rank of its individual scores (i.e. participant responses in that
condition) only after being combined with the scores from the comparison condition (Corder and
Foreman, 2014)
Note that the total number of participants analyzed in this table is 151, as two participants did not answer all
three items and were therefore removed from this analysis
No assurance
condition

2009), and that users might differentiate between limited and reasonable assurance due to a
contrast statement in the limited assurance report (Low and Boo, 2012). However, it is unclear
whether users should find management’s environmental report to be more believable in the
positive performance condition with limited or reasonable assurance. Hypothesis 4 predicts
that users perceive environmental reports to be more believable when assured versus not
assured for firms with positive environmental performance. To test this, the no assurance cell
was first compared to both assurance cells (i.e. combined limited and reasonable). Results
show that the mean rank of assured cells is significantly higher than the no assurance cell
(p 5 0.030, one-tailed). The next test compared the no assurance cell separately against the
limited and reasonable assurance cells. Results show that environmental reports are
perceived to be more believable with limited assurance rather than no assurance (p 5 0.010,
one-tailed), but there is no difference in believability between no assurance and reasonable
assurance (p 5 0.274, one-tailed). See Panel C of Table III for supporting analyses. To
complete the comparisons in the positive performance condition, H5 predicts no difference in
the believability of environmental reports with limited versus reasonable assurance. Results

Table III.

show that users do not perceive a difference in report believability when limited versus
reasonable assurance is provided in a positive performance condition (p 5 0.119, two-tailed).
See Panel C of Table III for supporting analyses. The results of H4 and H5 provide evidence
that in a positive performance condition, users perceive environmental reports to be more
believable when accompanied by limited rather than no assurance.
Given the findings for H4/H5 and the unexpected pattern of means displayed in Figure 3,
cells in the negative performance condition were also analyzed for differences. Results show
no significant differences within the negative performance condition, such that the
believability of management’s environmental report does not differ when accompanied by
(1) no assurance versus limited assurance (p 5 0.168, two-tailed), (2) no assurance versus
reasonable assurance (p 5 0.0749, two-tailed), or (3) limited assurance versus reasonable
assurance (p 5 0.308, two-tailed). While the pattern of means appears to be just the opposite of
those identified in the negative performance condition, there are no significant differences
within the negative performance condition. See Panel D of Table III for supporting analyses.
These results seem to support previous findings that the impact of assurance might be
context-specific to positive performance conditions (Coram et al., 2009). In summary, the
findings for H4/H5 indicate an increase in environmental report believability when limited
rather than no assurance is provided in a positive performance condition, yet no differences in
believability are identified within the negative performance condition.
Considering the behavior of the limited assurance cells and the pattern of means displayed
in Figure 3, testing was also performed on the effect of firm performance within specific
assurance conditions. Results show that negative performance reports are perceived to be
significantly more believable than positive performance reports when no assurance is
provided (p 5 0.014, two-tailed). However, the differences in believability between
performance conditions disappear when either limited (p 5 0.294, two-tailed) or reasonable
(p 5 0.165, two-tailed) assurance is provided. See Panel E of Table III for supporting analyses.
These findings seem to indicate that firm performance impacts perceptions of report
believability, but only when assurance is not provided.
4.2 Analyses of other dependent measures
As mentioned previously, this study also measured several other dependent variables well
established in the accounting literature. These include (1) the attractiveness of TWBC as a
potential investment opportunity, (2) perceived assurance provided by the accounting firm
(Hasan et al., 2003), (3) the impact of assurance on the credibility of results, and (4) the
perceived credibility and trustworthiness of management (cf. Mercer, 2004; Beyer et al., 2010;
Pflugrath et al., 2011). The attractiveness as a potential investment was collected and
analyzed to determine how users not tasked with assessing an environmental report as a
shareholder/investor would later evaluate it as a potential investment opportunity (i.e. impact
on behavior). The items on perceived/impact of assurance and management were collected to
serve as possible covariates, but because the ANOVA assumptions were violated, the results
of those items are not discussed.
To determine investment attractiveness, participants were asked “How attractive do you
find TWBC as a potential investment opportunity?” Participants rated this item using a fully
labeled seven-point Likert scale with endpoints Very Bad (3) to Very Good (þ3). Analyses
were again performed using non-parametric Mann–Whitney U tests. Results show that
participants in the positive performance condition (mean 1.711) rated TWBC as a
significantly better investment opportunity than those in the negative performance
condition (mean0.857) (p < 0.001, two-tailed). Further, within the negative performance
condition, assurance significantly increases the attractiveness of the investment. Specifically,
the no assurance cell (mean1.412) is perceived to be a significantly less attractive
investment opportunity when compared to the limited assurance cell (mean0.273)

(p 5 0.007, two-tailed) or the reasonable assurance cell (mean0.571) (p 5 0.049, two-tailed).
Significant differences were not identified within the positive performance condition. See
Table IV for supporting analyses. These findings demonstrate a main effect of firm
performance on investment attractiveness such that users perceive firms with positive
environmental performance to be a better investment opportunity, and that the provision of
assurance for firms with negative performance can enhance the attractiveness of the firm as
an investment opportunity.
4.3 Supplemental analyses
In testing the no assurance condition, participants were asked to “please indicate the extent
to which TWBC’s greenhouse gas emission indicators were verified (i.e. assured).” Using a
fully labeled seven-point Likert scale with endpoints No Verification (Assurance) (0) and
High Verification (Assurance) (6), results show that 92.5 percent (62/67) of participants
believed some level of assurance had been provided (i.e. more than zero) and 77.6 percent
(52/67) of participants believed at least a moderate level of assurance had been provided. In
the no assurance condition, there was no mention of assurance, which means users believed
these disclosures were assured even when no explicit statement was offered. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the study fails to find differences between reasonable assurance and no
assurance in analyzing report believability, particularly in the positive performance
condition. If non-expert users assume environmental reports are assured, then similar
reactions should be expected when they (1) do not receive an assurance report or (2) receive a
reasonable assurance report (that does not make it clear that a lower level of assurance
exists). This is consistent with Low and Boo’s (2012) finding that statements contrasting
levels of assurance help less-informed users better understand the assurance being
provided.
Panel A: Cell means, (standard deviations), and sample sizes
Assurance
Firm performance
No assurance
Limited
Positive
Negative
Marginal means

Reasonable

Marginal means
1.7105 (1.0560)
n 5 76
0.8571 (1.5106)
n 5 77
Total
Sample
n 5 153

1.6970 (1.0150)
n 5 33
1.4118 (1.2581)
n 5 34
0.1194 (1.9347)

1.9200 (0.8622)
n 5 25
0.2727 (1.6090)
n 5 22
0.8936 (1.6712)

1.4444 (1.3382)
n 5 18
0.5714 (1.5353)
n 5 21
0.3590 (1.7545)

n 5 67

n 5 47

n 5 39

Panel B: Cell comparisons using nonparametric Mann–Whitney U tests
Mean
Sum of
Comparison
N
rank
rank

U-value

Z

p-value
(two-tailed)

Positive performance
76
107.86
8197.0
581.0
8.555
<0.001
Negative performance
77
46.55
3584.0
5271.0
Negative performance / No assurance
34
23.75
807.5
535.5
2.701
0.007
Negative performance / Limited
22
35.84
788.5
212.5
assurance
Negative performance / No assurance
34
24.63
837.5
471.5
1.975
0.049
Negative performance / Reasonable
21
33.45
702.5
242.5
assurance
Note(s): This dependent variable asked participants to rate “How attractive do you find TWBC as a potential
investment opportunity?” using a fully labeled seven-point Likert scale with endpoints Very Bad (3) and Very
Good (þ3)

Table IV.
Dependent variable:
Potential investment
opportunity

5. Discussion and conclusion
This study examines whether non-expert environmental report users perceive a difference in
the believability of management’s environmental report based on a company’s relative
environmental performance or the level of assurance provided by an accounting firm under
the recently clarified US attestation standards. It also investigated whether a firm’s relative
environmental performance interacted with the level of assurance to influence perceptions of
environmental report believability.
Findings indicate that users perceive environmental reports to be believable, but there is
no main effect for the provision/level of assurance obtained. Consistent with theory (e.g.
Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004), there is a main effect for firm performance in
which negative performance reports are perceived to be more believable than positive
performance reports. Further analyses reveal this effect is driven by negative performance
reports being perceived as significantly more believable when no assurance is present. The
firm performance effect is eliminated when limited or reasonable assurance is provided. This
study also identifies an interaction in which positive performance reports with limited
assurance, but not reasonable assurance, are perceived to be more believable than reports
with no assurance. No differences are identified in the believability of negative performance
reports due to the provision or level of assurance.
Results of this study inform academic theory, practitioners, and standard setters.
Theory on firm performance suggests that users find reports depicting negative firm
performance to be more believable than reports depicting positive performance (e.g.
Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004). This study reinforces firm performance
theory when no assurance is present, but provides evidence that assurance on
environmental reports can serve to eliminate differences in report believability that stem
from firm performance. Within firm performance conditions, no differences in report
believability were identified between the negative performance cells (i.e. when limited,
reasonable, or no assurance was provided). This aligns with the notion that reports
depicting negative performance are inherently believable, and assurance does not enhance
this believability. However, within the positive performance condition, results indicate that
environmental reports are perceived to be more believable with limited assurance rather
than no assurance. This finding partially supports the notion that the influence of
assurance is limited to positive performance conditions (Coram et al., 2009). One possible
explanation for why users found the environmental report to be as believable with
reasonable or no assurance is that users in the no assurance condition assumed the
disclosures had been verified or assured (as previously discussed); as such, seeing a
reasonable assurance report would only confirm this assumption. However, seeing a limited
assurance report would also confirm this assumption, but also highlight that a higher level
of assurance was not obtained by management, and it is plausible that this highlighted
contrast in assurances is associated with the limited assurance benefit observed in the
positive performance condition (Low and Boo, 2012). Indeed, this limited assurance benefit
stands in contrast to Riviere-Giordano et al. (2018), who find that financial analysts are less
likely to recommend firms with positive environmental performance that receive low rather
than no assurance.
This study also contributes to the literature on the influence of different levels of
assurance in a CSR context (e.g. Hasan et al., 2003; Hodge et al., 2009; Riviere-Giordano et al.,
2018). Specifically, results indicate that users do not perceive a difference in report
believability when offered limited or reasonable assurance in either a positive or negative
performance setting. Further, while previous studies have focused on the impact of CSR
information on firm valuation and investment decisions (e.g. Hasan et al., 2003; Dhaliwal et al.,
2012; Elliott et al., 2014; Reimsbach et al., 2018; Riviere-Giordano et al., 2018), this study
focuses on whether these disclosures are believable to the broader group of stakeholders who

are not necessarily evaluating the information as part of a wealth-maximization decision.
This is an important group to study as a company’s environmental impact has implications
for a broad range of stakeholders beyond those considering the firm as a financial investment
(Moser and Martin, 2012). Results indicate that this user group finds environmental CSR
reports to be generally believable, but their perceptions of believability can be impacted by
firm performance and the provision of limited assurance in specific settings.
From a practitioner standpoint, this study demonstrates conditions in which users
respond differently to positive and negative environmental performance. Specifically,
negative performance reports are perceived to be more believable, but only when not assured.
If a firm seeks to use its environmental report to speak to a broader group of stakeholders, this
study suggests that limited assurance is an effective tool to manage impressions and enhance
report believability when performance is positive. As such, findings suggest firms that invest
in environmental activities and report positive results should consider obtaining the lower
(and less costly) level of assurance to enhance the believability of their environmental report.
From a standard-setter perspective, findings demonstrate the importance of clearly
communicating to users when no assurance or verification is provided on environmental
reports (the study finds that many users believed the non-assured reports had received
assurance). As such, this study calls into question whether users would benefit from formal
reporting requirements that have companies explicitly specify when no assurance is
provided on environmental disclosures/reports.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, as the believability index did not
conform to the assumptions of ANOVA, the analysis of potential covariates was limited.
Second, the study could not show which element of the environmental disclosures
participants responded to most strongly. For example, it could have been (1) the numerical
distance between TWBC’s performance and the industry average, (2) the displayed
percentage differences, or (3) the narrative associated with TWBC’s performance. Finally,
this study focused on one aspect of environmental reporting, that being greenhouse gas
emissions. Future research should consider responses to other aspects of environmental
reporting, such as water usage or energy efficiency.
While environmental CSR reporting remains a largely voluntary activity in the US, it is
important to further understand the users of this information and the attributes of
reporting that they respond to differently. As this reporting becomes more structured,
formalized, and prevalent, it will also remain critical to closely monitor the expectations
and vulnerabilities of report users. We hope this study helps further the collective
understanding of such users.

Notes
1. CSR reporting is “largely” voluntary in the US, with the exception of (1) required US Securities &
Exchange Commission disclosures, (2) the Dodd-Frank Act requirement to disclose conflict minerals,
and (3) the mandate for federal agencies to report CSR performance under Presidential Executive
Order 13,514 (KPMG, 2013). Examples of CSR disclosures required by the Securities & Exchange
Commission include those prescribed in release No. 33–9,106, Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, and release No. 34–67716, Conflict Minerals (Littan, 2014).
2. This is a change from the superseded U.S. standard, AT-101, Attest Engagements (AICPA, 2001),
which refers to high and moderate assurances.
3. Hasan et al. (2003) use high and moderate assurances as defined in ISAE 100. However, ISAE 100 was
superseded by ISAE 3000 in 2000, and soon thereafter required the use of limited and reasonable
assurances. Legacy ISAEs and U.S. Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAEs)
have both described assurance levels as high or moderate, yet the current standards refer to these
assurances as limited and reasonable (IAASB, 2013; AICPA, 2016). In all cases, and as used

throughout this study, reasonable and high assurances are used to describe levels of assurance that
are stronger than limited or moderate.
4. CSR reporting firms might also fear a backlash from report users when specific disclosures are
discontinued, much in the same way that firms fear investor reactions to discontinued earnings
guidance (cf. Chen et al., 2011). By keeping the recurring CSR indicators and adding more over time,
CSR reports will naturally grow and inevitably present more balanced reporting of positive and
negative performance indicators. However, this assumes that firms will not be able to maintain
purely positive performance across an ever growing and diversifying set of CSR disclosures.
5. IRB approval was obtained from the university where the authors were located at the time of the
study for the use of human subjects for this experiment.
6. Participants closely resemble non-professional investors. Owens and Hawkins (2019) point out that
“nonprofessional investor participants recruited from MTurk are reasonably good participants for
nonprofessional investor research,” and as such, may be used to answer a variety of research
questions (p. 3). Hunt and Scheetz (2019) provide a list of other accounting studies that have also used
MTurk to recruit non-professional investors, which includes Rennekamp (2012), Bonner (2014),
Farkas and Murthy (2014), Triki et al. (2015), and Kelton and Murthy (2016). Finally, Farrell et al.
(2016) find that MTurk participants can serve as valid proxies for non-experts in accounting
research.
7. Selected G4 indicators are defined by the GRI as follows:
G4-EN15: Direct greenhouse gas emissions (Scope 1): “Emissions from operations that are owned or
controlled by the organization” (GRI, 2013).
G4-EN16: Energy indirect greenhouse gas emissions (Scope 2): “Emissions that result from the
generation of purchased or acquired electricity, heating, cooling, and steam consumed by the
organization” (GRI, 2013).
G4-EN17: Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions (Scope 3): “Other indirect greenhouse gas
emissions are all indirect emissions (not included in Scope 2) that occur outside of the organization,
including both upstream and downstream emissions” (GRI, 2013).
G4-EN19: Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions: “A decrease in greenhouse gas emissions or an
increase in removal or storage of greenhouse gas emissions from the atmosphere, relative to baseline
emissions” (GRI, 2013).
8. Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that having all points labeled minimizes response bias, maximizes variance
and power, and minimizes error. They also find that seven-point scales may maximize variance.
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Appendix: Excerpts of experimental materials
A. Management’s presentation and description of greenhouse gas emission
performance—Positive performance condition
Below is page 12 from the TWBC Environmental Sustainability Report. This page was written by TWBC
management.
Emissions
This section describes the Tasty Water Beverage Company’s (TWBC) greenhouse gas emissions using
reporting indicators defined by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI is an organization that
provides a standardized sustainability reporting framework to be used by companies around the world
in reporting the results of sustainability activities.
The following table summarizes our results for select GRI indicators and includes the overall
average performance of the Food and Beverage Industry along with a factor showing how our
performance differed from the industry average for each indicator. As shown, our results for 2014 were
better than the industry average for all indicators (see Table AI).
Direct greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN15, which includes
“emissions from operations that are owned or controlled by” TWBC. During 2014, we directly emitted
41.0 metric tons (in thousands) of CO2 (carbon dioxide) and CO2 equivalents into the environment. The
primary sources for these emissions included our bottling plants, processing plants, and distribution
trucks.
Energy indirect greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN16, which
includes “emissions that result from the generation of purchased or acquired electricity, heating, cooling,
and steam consumed by” TWBC. During 2014, we emitted 94.5 metric tons (in thousands) of energy
indirect CO2 and CO2 equivalents into the environment. The primary sources for these emissions
included our heating, cooling, and powering of bottling and processing plants.
Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN17, which
includes indirect emissions (not included in “energy indirect”) that “occur outside of the organization,
including both upstream and downstream emissions.” During 2014, we emitted 62.9 metric tons (in
thousands) of other indirect CO2 and CO2 equivalents into the environment. The primary sources for

GRI
indicator
G4-EN15

Description

TWBC
Results for
2014

Food and Beverage
Industry average for
2014

Direct greenhouse gas
41.0
102.9
emissions
G4-EN16
Energy indirect
94.5
205.5
greenhouse gas
emissions
G4-EN17
Other indirect
62.9
187.9
greenhouse gas
emissions
G4-EN19
Reduction of greenhouse
62.4%
1.3%
gas emissions
Note(s): CO2 (and equivalent) emissions in thousands of metric tons

TWBC % diff. from
industry average
60.2%
54.0%
66.5%
þ61.1%
Table AI.

these emissions included our bottle producers, raw material (ingredients) providers, and from coolers at
retail stores displaying our products.
Reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN19. This year,
we experienced a 62.4 percent reduction in total greenhouse gas emissions across our entire company
(including direct, energy indirect, and other indirect emissions), as measured using baseline emissions
established on December 31, 2013.
B. Management’s presentation and description of greenhouse gas emission
performance—Negative performance condition
Below is page 12 from the TWBC Environmental Sustainability Report. This page was written by TWBC
management.
Emissions
This section describes the Tasty Water Beverage Company’s (TWBC) greenhouse gas emissions using
reporting indicators defined by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI is an organization that
provides a standardized sustainability reporting framework to be used by companies around the world
in reporting the results of sustainability activities.
The following table summarizes our results for select GRI indicators and includes the overall
average performance of the Food and Beverage Industry along with a factor showing how our
performance differed from the industry average for each indicator. As shown, our results for 2014 were
worse than the industry average for all indicators (see Table AII).
Direct greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN15, which includes
“emissions from operations that are owned or controlled by” TWBC. During 2014, we directly emitted 164.8
metric tons (in thousands) of CO2 (carbon dioxide) and CO2 equivalents into the environment. The primary
sources for these emissions included our bottling plants, processing plants, and distribution trucks.
Energy indirect greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN16, which
includes “emissions that result from the generation of purchased or acquired electricity, heating, cooling,
and steam consumed by” TWBC. During 2014, we emitted 316.5 metric tons (in thousands) of energy
indirect CO2 and CO2 equivalents into the environment. The primary sources for these emissions
included our heating, cooling, and powering of bottling and processing plants.
Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN17, which
includes indirect emissions (not included in “energy indirect”) that “occur outside of the organization,
including both upstream and downstream emissions.” During 2014, we emitted 312.9 metric tons (in
thousands) of other indirect CO2 and CO2 equivalents into the environment. The primary sources for
these emissions included our bottle producers, raw material (ingredients) providers, and from coolers at
retail stores displaying our products.
Reductions (increases) of greenhouse gas emissions are reported under the GRI indicator G4-EN19.
This year we experienced a 59.8 percent increase in total greenhouse gas emissions across our entire
company (including direct, energy indirect, and other indirect emissions), as measured using baseline
emissions established on December 31, 2013.

GRI
indicator
G4-EN15

Table AII.

Description

TWBC
results for
2014

Food and Beverage
Industry average for
2014

Direct greenhouse gas
164.8
emissions
G4-EN16
Energy indirect
316.5
greenhouse gas emissions
G4-EN17
Other indirect greenhouse
312.9
gas emissions
G4-EN19
Reduction (increase) of
(59.8%)
greenhouse gas emissions
Note(s): CO2 (and equivalent) emissions in thousands of metric tons

TWBC % diff. from
industry average

102.9

þ60.2%

205.5

þ54.0%

187.9

þ66.5%

1.3%

61.1%

C. Independent Accountant’s Report
Panel A displays the full Independent Accountant’s Report provided in the positive performance,
reasonable assurance, condition. Panels B, C, and D describe/display how this report varies from Panel A
for the remaining conditions that received assurance.
Panel A—Positive performance, reasonable assurance
Independent Accountant’s Report. Tasty Water Beverage Company Board of Directors and
Management:
We have examined the following selected environmental data (the “selected indicators”) included on
page 12 of The Tasty Water Beverage Company’s 2014 Environmental Sustainability Report (the
“Report”) for the year ended December 31, 2014. Tasty Water Beverage Company’s management is
responsible for the selected indicators, based on the reporting criteria referenced in Table AIII below.
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the indicators included in Table AIII based on our
examination.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the indicators in Table AIII are presented
in accordance with the referenced criteria, in all material respects. An examination involves performing
procedures to obtain evidence about the selected indicators. The nature, timing, and extent of the
procedures selected depend on our judgment, including an assessment of the risks of material
misstatement of the selected indicators, whether due to fraud or error. We believe that the evidence we
obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
Environmental and energy use data are subject to measurement uncertainties resulting from
limitations inherent in the nature and the methods used for determining such data. The selection of
different but acceptable measurement techniques can result in materially different measurements. The
precision of different measurement techniques may also vary.
In our opinion, the selected indicators presented in Table AIII for the Tasty Water Beverage
Company for the year ended December 31, 2014 are presented in accordance with the referenced
reporting criteria, in all material respects.
(Large International Accounting Firm)
New York, New York
February 18, 2015
Panel B—Positive performance, Limited assurance
The title of this report is modified as prescribed by the AICPA and appears as the “Independent
Accountant’s Review Report” to reflect the limited (rather than reasonable) level of assurance provided
2014
results

Description

Measurement

Direct greenhouse gas
emissions (scope 1)

Greenhouse gas emissions
measured in metric tons of
CO2 equivalents

41.0

Energy indirect
greenhouse gas
emissions (scope 2)

Greenhouse gas emissions
measured in metric tons of
CO2 equivalents

94.5

Other indirect
greenhouse gas
emissions (scope 3)

Greenhouse gas emissions
measured in metric tons of
CO2 equivalents

62.9

Reduction of
greenhouse gas
emissions

Percentage decrease in total
greenhouse gas emissions
from prior year

62.4%

Reporting criteria
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition

Table AIII.

Table AIV.

2014
results

Description

Measurement

Direct greenhouse gas
emissions (scope 1)

Greenhouse gas emissions
measured in metric tons of
CO2 equivalents

164.8

Energy indirect
greenhouse gas
emissions (scope 2)

Greenhouse gas emissions
measured in metric tons of
CO2 equivalents

316.5

Other indirect
greenhouse gas
emissions (scope 3)

Greenhouse gas emissions
measured in metric tons of
CO2 equivalents

312.9

Reduction (increase) of
greenhouse gas
emissions

Percentage decrease in total
greenhouse gas emissions
from prior year

(59.8%)

Reporting criteria
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition
World Resources Institute (WRI)/World
Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Greenhouse
Gas Protocol—Revised Edition

by the accounting firm. Further, throughout the report where Panel A refers to examinations/opinions,
Panel B refers to reviews/conclusions. Finally, the scope and opinion/conclusion paragraphs appear as
follows:

Scope paragraph. Our review was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the review to obtain limited assurance about whether any material modifications should be
made to the selected indicators in order for each to be presented in accordance with the criteria identified
above. A review is substantially less in scope than an examination, the objective of which is to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the selected indicators are presented in accordance with the
criteria, in all material respects, in order to express an opinion. Accordingly, we do not express such an
opinion. We believe that our review provides a reasonable basis for our conclusion.
Opinion/conclusion paragraph. Based on our review, we are not aware of any material
modifications that should be made to the selected indicators in Table AIV for the Tasty Water Beverage
Company for the year ended December 31, 2014, in order for each indicator to be in accordance with the
referenced reporting criteria.
Panel C—Negative performance, reasonable assurance
In contrast to Panel A, Panel C presents negative performance information in the “2014 Results” section
of Table AIV as follows:
Panel D—Negative performance, limited assurance
This report is modified to present a review with limited assurance, as described in Panel B. Further, this
report reflects negative performance and therefore displays Table AIII as shown in Panel C.
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